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Mr. Justice Rufus W. Peckham: The Police 
Power and the Individual in a Changing World 
William F. Duker* 
"[A111 men, however great and however honest, are almost nec- 
essarily affected by the general belief of their times." 
Rufus W. Peckham, 
People u. Budd.' 
In searching out the origins and legitimacy of "liberty of 
contract," Roscoe Pound concluded that the concept had no le- 
gitimate foundation and was created by an act of judicial usur- 
pation.' Pound posited a number of reasons for the establish- 
ment of the concept," but failed to take notice of the most 
salient: liberty of contract was articulated in response to legisla- 
tion designed to meet the conditions of the new industrial state. 
Individual liberty was threatened from two fronts: the new in- 
dustrial entity and government's response to it. 
This was the dilemma confronted by Rufus W. Peckham, 
associate justice of the New York Court of Appeals from 1887 to 
1895 and Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court 
from 1896 to 1909. Peckham's approach to this problem is the 
subject of this Article. 
Peckham is probably best remembered for setting the occa- 
sion for Mr. Justice Holmes' often quoted critique of the Fuller 
Court's activist conception of the judicial role. In his dissent in 
Lochner v. New York,' Holmes charged that the majority opin- 
ion was founded "upon an economic theory which a large part of 
* B.A., 1976, State University of New York at Albany; Ph.D., 1978, University of 
Cambridge. 
1. 117 N.Y. 1, 47, 22 N.E. 670, 686, 78'N.Y.S. App. 185, 201 (1889) (Peckham, J., 
dissenting). 
2. Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 454-58 (1909). 
3. Id. at 457. 
4. 198 US. 45 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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the country [did] not entertain."' Holmes argued that the term 
"liberty" as employed in the fourteenth amendment was not in- 
tended to "enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social  static^."^ The 
"constitution [was] not intended to embody a particular eco- 
nomic theory;" rather, it was "made for people of fundamentally 
different views."' In support of his thesis, Holrnes pointed to an- 
titrust policy and traditional uses of the police power sanctioned 
by the Court. 
Despite Peckham's adherence to the liberty of contract the- 
ory, he had little difficulty upholding traditional uses of the po- 
lice power8 and was the Court's most articulate spokesman in 
5. Id. at 75. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. at 74-76. 
8. In North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908), Peckham, speak- 
ing for the Court, rejected a challenge to a municipal code insofar as it allowed the 
city-without providing for a prior hearing-to seize, condemn, or destroy food unfit for 
human consumption. Such power was determined to inhere in a state's right and duty to 
safeguard the lives and health of its inhabitants. Whether to allow a prior hearing was in 
Peckham's opinion a legislative determination. Consequently, the Court had no reason to 
consider the economic interest involved. The state presumptively had the right and duty 
to seize and to destroy unwholesome food. Id. at 320-21. 
In Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U.S. 183 (1900), which involved a city ordinance forbid- 
ding the sale of cigarettes without a license, the Court, in an opinion by Justice 
Peckham, held that unless such regulations were "so utterly unreasonable and extrava- 
gant in their nature and purpose that the property and personal rights of the citizen are 
unnecessarily, and in a manner wholly arbitrary, interfered with," they fell within the 
proper exercise of a state's police power. Id. at 188. See also Welch v. Swasey, 214 US. 
91 (1908) (sustaining a state's zoning power); Phillips v. City of Mobile, 208 U.S. 472 
(1908) (validating licensing fees charged breweries); Martin v. Trout, 199 US. 212 (1905) 
(upholding a state law suppressing gambling). 
Peckham's opinions involving the power of eminent domain, a power closely related 
to the police power, also reflect the great deference Peckham generally accorded legisla- 
tive judgments. In United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry., 160 US. 668 (1896), a railroad 
company whose land was being condemned for the erection of a war monument chal- 
lenged the government's exercise of its eminent domain power. In upholding the govern- 
ment's exercise of power, Peckham, in a burst of patriotism applauded by the profession, 
wrote: 
Any act of Congress which plainly and directly tends to enhance the respect 
and love of the citizen for the institutions of his country and to quicken and 
strengthen his motives to defend them, and which is germane to and inti- 
mately connected with and appropriate to the exercise of some one or all of the 
powers granted by Congress must be valid. 
Id. at 681. Again writing for the Court in Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 US. 
112 (1896), Justice Peckham upheld a California statute permitting the establishment of 
local irrigation districts empowered to exercise eminent domain and to assess all land- 
owners in the district for the support of irrigation projects. The great deference shown 
state authorities in Fallbrook was also evident in Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905), 
where Peckham and the Court, in determining whether a state statute permitting con- 
demnation by an individual for the purpose of obtaining water for his own land could be 
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implementing the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Peckham not only 
recognized limits to liberty of contract, he also rejected the ma- 
nipulation of laissez-faire economics and "Social Darwinism" by 
a few articulate captains of industry.@ Thus when the term "lais- 
sez-faire" is invoked to describe the judicial philosophy of 
Peckham, either the term must be reduced to its quintessential 
meaning, or it must be rejected as inaccurate. Peckham was not 
a spokesman for big business. And even though an instrumental- 
ist's analysis of Peckham's liberty of contract decisions might 
discredit this claim, such an approach would later uncover a par- 
adox when used to examine his antitrust opinions. Moreover, 
Peckham is of interest here as an intellectual force, not as a po- 
litical, social, or psychological character. This Article attempts 
to identify Peckham's "master idea," or the concept giving gui- 
dance to Peckham's opinions. The focus is on the idea itself. In- 
strumentalism, which focuses on the effect of an idea, and moti- 
vational inquiry, which focuses on the causes for the formulation 
of the idea, are beyond the scope of this Article. 
What was the master idea of Rufus W. Peckham? The juris- 
construed as a condemnation for a public use, observed that "what is a public use may 
frequently and largely depend upon the facts surrounding the subject, and . . . the peo- 
ple of a State, as also its courts, must in the nature of things be more familiar with such 
facts." Id. a t  369. 
Peckham decreed that the exercise of the police power was illegitimate in the follow- 
ing circumstances: where a licensing fee or utility rate was shown to be unreasonable (to 
Peckham this was tantamount to taking property without just compensation), Postal 
Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Taylor, 192 U.S. 64 (1904) (confiscatory rates unconstitutional); 
where the police power ran afoul of congressional power over interstate commerce, Atlan- 
tic Coastal Line R.R. v. Wharton, 207 U.S. 328 (1907) (stoppage of interstate trains); 
Central of Ga. Ry. v. Murphy, 196 U.S. 195 (1905) (interstate shipment of goods); Schol- 
lenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 1 (1898) (sale of oleomargarine); or where the con- 
gressional power over patents had been interfered with, Allen v. Riley, 203 U.S. 347 
(1906). In the commerce clause and patent cases the police power gave way to require- 
ments of federal supremacy. In the utility rate cases the police power gave way to the 
just compensation clause where the party challenging the rates demonstrated the unrea- 
sonableness ,of the rate or fee. 
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), involved a nontraditional application 
of the police power. A majority of the Court relied on the police power to sustain legisla- 
tion requiring compulsory vaccination of adults. Although such regulations had been up- 
held when applied to children, the application to adults was novel. Because Peckham 
dissented without opinion, his position is impossible to explain-with complete certainty. 
However, the case was handed down shortly before Lochner, and Peckham's position in 
Jacobson is consistent with the theory of Lochner. To  Peckham, the compulsory vaccina- 
tion law must have appeared to be a paternalistic and meddlesome interference with 
individual liberty. 
9. Wyllie, Social Darwinism and the Businessman, 103 PROC. AM. PHILOSOPHICAL. 
SOC'Y 629 (1959). 
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prudence of Peckham was rooted in a philosophical conception 
of individual liberty and a supporting political conception of the 
role of government that placed considerable emphasis on the re- 
lationship between the judicial and legislative branches of gov- 
ernment. In short, the best government was the least govern- 
ment. Trust was placed in the free individual, who, if left 
unfettered by needless governmental regulation, would grow 
more intelligent and more attuned to the moral law, thereby de- 
creasing the need for government.1° The judiciary was set up as 
a check on unnecessary governmental interference in the affairs 
of the individual. It was this conception of the judicial role that 
distinguished Peckham from Holmes. While Holmes was unwill- 
ing to identify public values and preferred to leave their identifi- 
cation to the democratic branches, Peckham employed judicial 
office to discern and announce substantive values.ll 
If any economic interest was favored by Peckham, it was 
that of the "rugged individual." But for Peckham that prefer- 
ence remained neutral, since the rugged individual was favored 
by nature. Government should neither aid nor hinder his sur- 
vival. Liberty required equal treatment, and equal opportunity 
was assured only in the absence of illegal combinations of eco- 
nomic power. Peckham's support for antitrust policy was thus 
consistent with his belief in limited government. Governmental 
intervention to check monopolies and other concentrations of ec- 
onomic power was designed to restore a situation in which the 
free individual could once again prevail without governmental 
intervention. 
Analysis commences with an examination of Peckham's lib- 
erty of contract decisions while a member of the New York 
Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court. Juxta- 
posed to these cases are Peckham's antitrust opinions. What 
emerges is the portrait of a judge attempting to cope with the 
problems of a new industrial state in a classical liberal man- 
ner-a negative rather than positive approach. By this approach 
the majoritarian branches could eliminate dangerous concentra- 
tions of economic power, but they could not interfere on the in- 
dividual's behalf to equalize the bargaining relationship. 
10. S. FINE, LAISSEZ FAIRE AND THE GENERALWELFARE STATE 5 (1956). 
11. There is certainly no indication that Peckham perceived constitutional law to be 
stagnant. See notes 22-24 and accompanying text infra. 
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In Munn v. I l l in~is, '~ the United States Supreme Court re- 
jected an attack on a state law regulating the storage rates of 
grain elevators. The grain elevator owners argued that the regu- 
lation of storage prices deprived them of the use of their prop- 
erty without due process of law. Chief Justice Waite's majority 
opinion emphasized that the scope of the state's police power 
encompassed the regulation of private property when such regu- 
lation was necessary for the public good. Justice Field's dissent 
argued that the term "liberty" as used in the fourteenth amend- 
ment meant something more than freedom from physical re- 
straint. It included the freedom to use one's property without 
undue governmental interference.l8 
Although Field's dissent in Munn remained a minority view 
on the Supreme Court for twenty years, an increasing number of 
state courts later adopted it. The position was first and foremost 
a statement on governmental power. It was a position that con- 
ceptualized the role of the judiciary as a check between legisla- 
tive power and the individual. Its chief exponent on the New 
York Court of Appeals between 1887 and 1895 was Rufus W. 
Peckham. Peckham's more famous opinions in Lochner14 and 
Allgeyer v. Louisiana16 were no surprise to those familiar with 
his record on the New York Court of Appeals. 
In People u. Gil1son,l6 Peckham, speaking on behalf of the 
entire court, invalidated a provision of the state penal code 
prohibiting the sale of food or any offer to sell upon a represen- 
tation or inducement that something else would be provided as a 
gift, prize, premium, or reward to the purchaser. The provision, 
allegedly part of the state's efforts to regulate lotteries, was em- 
ployed by the state against the Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. (A 
& P) for offering a teacup and saucer to a purchaser of coffee. 
A & P attempted to distinguish its sales method from the 
typical lottery scheme by arguing that the statute's effect was 
"to oppress a certain class of citizen traders, and to improperly 
discriminate against them in their business, and thereby restrict, 
and so virtually prohibit their use of their own property."17 The 
12. 94 US.  113 (1876). 
13. Id. at 142-43 (Field, J., dissenting). 
14. See notes 53-56 and accompanying text infra. 
15. 165 U.S. 578 (1897). 
16. 109 N.Y. 389, 17 N.E. 343, 72 N.Y.S. App. at 819 (1888). 
17. Id. at 390 (not included in parallel sources). 
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state responded that the law was a valid exercise of police power 
in that it sought to regulate trade in impure, unwholesome, and 
adulterated food, and to prevent fraud and deception. 
Peckham's decision limiting the state's exercise of police 
power began with an analysis of the scope of judicial review. Af- 
ter paying homage to the supremacy clause, the presumption of 
constitutionality, and the police power, and after acknowledging 
the impropriety of judicial veto based merely upon natural jus- 
tice and equity,18 Peckham announced that 
a person living under our Constitution has the right to adopt 
and follow such lawful industrial pursuit, not injurious to the 
community, as he may see fit. The term "liberty" as used in 
the Constitution is not dwarfed into mere freedom from physi- 
cal restraint of the person of the citizen as by incarceration, 
but is deemed to embrace the right of man to be free in the 
enjoyment of the faculties with which he has been endowed by 
his creator, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for 
the common welfare. Liberty, in its broad sense, as understood 
in this country, means the right not only of freedom from ser- 
vitude, imprisonment or restraint, but the right of one to use 
his faculties in all lawful ways to live and work where he will, 
to earn his livelihood in any lawful calling and to pursue any 
lawful trade or avocation.lS 
In Peckham's view the statute under review violated this liberty. 
He could not see that the statute had anything to do with un- 
wholesome food. Nor could he accept the proposition that the 
statute was needed to safeguard the customer from buying more 
than he needed. Although it was within the legislative domain to 
determine what laws and regulations were needed to protect the 
public health, safety, and welfare, it was the duty of the judici- 
ary to insure that the means taken by the legislature had a di- 
rect relation to a legitimate end?' Thus Gillson was similar to 
Lochner: in Lochner the state sought to protect the individual 
by prohibiting him from working longer than a certain number 
of hours, while in Gillson the state sought to protect people from 
purchasing more than they needed by denying A & P the right 
to merchandise its goods in certain ways. In both cases Peckham 
failed to detect a direct relation between the exercise of the po- 
lice power and public health. 
18. Id. a t  397-98, 17 N.E. a t  345, 72 N.Y.S. App. a t  821. 
19. Id. a t  398-99, 17 N.E. a t  345, 72 N.Y.S. App. a t  821-22. 
20. Id. a t  401, 17 N.E. a t  347, 72 N.Y.S. App. a t  823. 
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The following year the court of appeals in People v. Budd21 
followed the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Munn and up- 
held a statute prescribing a maximum charge for storing grain in 
stationary elevators. Peckham's dissent was drawn from his ear- 
lier unpublished opinion in People v. W ~ l s h . ~ ~  In discounting 
the common law idea of "paternal government" expressed by the 
great legal commentator Sir Matthew Hale, Peckham noted that 
"all men, however great and however honest, are almost necessa- 
rily affected by the general belief of their times."23 Peckham rec- 
ognized "a truer conception of the proper functions of govern- 
rnentef12' He disagreed with the majority's willingness to allow 
the state to interfere with individual liberty-as he conceptual- 
ized it in Gillson-simply because the individual devotes his 
property to a business in which the public is greatly interested, 
or because the individual enjoys a monopoly by the fortuity that 
his property is conveniently s i t~ated. '~  To uphold such legisla- 
tion, warned Peckham, would be to encourage class warfare: 
[I]n addition to the ordinary competition that exists through- 
out all industries, a new competition will be introduced, that of 
competition for the possession of the government, so that legis- 
lative aid may be given to the class in possession thereof in its 
contests with rival classes or interests in all sections and cor- 
ners of the industrial world.g6 
In conclusion, Peckham observed that the legislation was not 
only "vicious," "communistic," and "inefficient," but illegal in 
that it sought 
to interfere with the lawful privileges of the individual to seek 
and obtain such compensation as he can for the use of his own 
property, where he neither asks nor receives from the sovereign 
power any special right or immunity not given to and possessed 
by every other citizen, and where he has not devoted his prop- 
21. 117 N.Y. 1, 22 N.E. 670, 78 N.Y.S. App. 185 (1889). 
22. 22 N.E. 682 (1889) (dissenting opinion of Judge Peckham incorporated into Peo- 
ple v. Budd, 117 N.Y. a t  34-71, 78 N.Y.S. App. a t  197-210). Justice Gray concurred with 
the views presented by Peckham in Walsh. He could see no protection against such "so- 
cialistic laws" if this act were sustained. He argued that "the theory of such legislation is 
a startling departure from the true conception of governmental functions." Like 
Peckham, he expressed his disapproval for legislation favoring particular classes. 117 
N.Y. at 33, 22 N.E. at 681-82, 78 N.Y.S. App. a t  196 (Gray, J., dissenting). 
23. 117 N.Y. at 47, 22 N.E. at 686, 78 N.Y.S. App. a t  201 (Peckham, J., dissenting). 
24. Id., 22 N.E. at 687, 78 N.Y.S. App. a t  202. 
25. Id. at 40, 22 N.E. at 684, 78 N.Y.S. App. at 199. 
26. Id. at 68-69, 22 N.E. at 694, 78 N.Y.S. App. at 209. 
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erty to any public use, within the meaning of the law.=' 
The elevator operator in Budd was the paradigmatic rugged 
individual for Peckham. His monopoly was not acquired with 
the help of government or combination, but by superior individ- 
ualism. To enforce paternalistic legislation against such an indi- 
vidual would only involve government in class conflict. Peckham 
was therefore not blind to the class struggles of his day; he was 
merely denying government a role in that "normal human 
activity." 
Consistent with his conception of the judicial role, Peckham 
dissented from the court's decision in Talcott v. City of Buf- 
fa10.~~ In Talcott the majority denied taxpayer standing to keep 
the governing authorities of Buffalo from substituting electric 
street lighting for gas lighting in certain sections of the city-an 
official action within their power and discretion-without the re- 
quired allegation of fraud, collusion, corruption, or bad faith. 
Peckham believed that the exercise of judicial power to enjoin 
the "squandering of public funds" by public officials would be 
"exceedingly healthful."n He believed that the democratic elec- 
tion processes offered only a "slight deterrent effect" and af- 
forded no redress for past reckless spending.'O As Peckham rec- 
ognized (and the Warren Court later demonstrateds1), the 
judicial identification of fundamental values and the enforce- 
ment of those values by an injunction effectively furthers an un- 
derlying premise of constitutionalism-that government should 
be limited. 
Peckham's final court of appeals opinion involving a conflict 
between the exercise of police power and individual liberty was 
handed down ten months before his nomination to the United 
States Supreme Court. Writing for the court, Peckham sustained 
the Consolidation Act of New York, which permitted the board 
of health to direct owners of substandard tenements to install 
adequate water supply facilities?% Judge Bartlett dissented, ar- 
guing that the statute placed unlimited power in the hands of 
the board of health and thus unconstitutionally deprived the 
27. Id. at 71, 22 N.E. at 695, 78 N.Y.S. App. at 210 (emphasis added). 
28. 125 N.Y. 280, 26 N.E. 263, 86 N.Y.S. App. 975 (1891). 
29. Id. at 289, 26 N.E. at 265, 86 N.Y.S. App. at 978 (Peckham, J., dissenting). 
30. Id. at 290, 26 N.E. at 265, 86 N.Y.S. App. at 978. 
31. See 0. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978). 
32. Health Dep't v. Rector of Trinity Church, 145 N.Y. 32, 39 N.E. 833, 106 N.Y.S. 
App. 994 (1895). 
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landlord of control over his pr~perty.~' Unlike his colleague, 
Peckham had no difficulty envisioning a limit to such legislation. 
He judicially amended the statute to substitute the judgment of 
the judiciary for that of the board of health in the determination 
of the adequacy of the required facilities? It was by this same 
strategy that Peckham would eventually implement his Walsh- 
Budd position and thereby limit Munn v. Illinois. 
Upon the death of Mr. Justice Jackson in 1895, President 
Cleveland began the search for a replacement. Apparently ready 
to do battle with Senator David Bennett Hill and his colleagues, 
Cleveland once again offered a seat on the Court to William 
Butler Hornblower, whose nomination had been defeated less 
than two years earlier because of Senator Hill's opposition." 
Hornblower declined the offer in early November,JB and shortly 
afterward Cleveland wrote to Hill to determine whether Rufus 
Peckham was acceptable? 
New York Democrats had preferred Peckham over Horn- 
blower to fill the earlier vacancy.s8 Senator Hill had even praised 
him as one who "would make a magnificent member of the Su- 
preme Court."ss Therefore, Hill offered no resistance to Rufus 
Peckham, and Cleveland's nomination of Peckham on the third 
of December40 was confirmed by the Senate six days later." Ap- 
parently Peckham's conception of the role of the judiciary was 
no obstacle to his securing a seat on the United States Supreme 
Court. 
Peckham's first opportunity to espouse his expanded notion 
of individual liberty in the Supreme Court came in Allgeyer u. 
L o u i ~ i a n a . ~ ~  Allgeyer tested the constitutionality of a state stat- 
33. Id. at 53-54, 39 N.E. at 840-41, 106 N.Y.S. App. at 1001-02 (Bartlett, J., 
dissenting). 
34. 145 N.Y. at 49-52, 39 N.E. at 839-40, 106 N.Y.S. App. at 1000-01. 
35. See generally Pierce, A Vacancy on the Supreme Court: The Politics of Judi- 
cial Appointment 1893-94, 39 TENN. L. REV. 555 (1972). 
36. A. NEVINS, GROVER CLEVELAND 572 (1932). 
37. LETTERS OF GROVER CLEVELAND 414-15 (A. Nevins ed. 1933). 
38. Pierce, supra note 35, at 563. 
39. N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1894, at 1, col. 1. 
40. 28 CONG. REC. 25 (1895). 
41. Id. at 90. 
42. 165 U.S. 578 (1897). 
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ute prohibiting individuals or brokers from procuring insurance 
on property located in the state from any foreign corporation 
that had not complied with state law. Though Peckham may be 
accused of straining in Allgeyer to present his views on individ- 
ual liberty and the judicial role by analyzing the statute's consti- 
tutionality according to "liberty of contract" rather than com- 
merce clause principles, dicta in Peckham's Hopkins v. United 
 state^'^ opinion-which acknowledged congressional power to 
regulate interstate transportation of a commodity but not the 
stock certificate that represented that commodity-indicates 
that more likely he did not consider an insurance policy to be an 
article of interstate commerce. 
Peckham declared that the Louisiana statute was repugnant 
to the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, explain- 
ing, as he had done in his first case of this type on the New York 
Court of Appeals, that the liberty mentioned in the due process 
clause comprehended not merely the right of the individual to 
be free from physical restraint, but also included 
the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his 
faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and 
work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; 
to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to 
enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary and es- 
sential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the pur- 
poses above menti~ned.~' 
In keeping with his conception of the judicial role, Peckham re- 
fused to define the extent of this liberty vis-a-vis the police 
power, reserving that question for each situation in which the 
question arose. The view that had earlier found expression in 
the Supreme Court only in the minority opinions of Justices 
Field and Bradley was now expressed on behalf of the entire 
Court by its newest member, Justice Peckham. 
Although the Court expressed concern for the liberty of con- 
tract doctrine in Holden v. Hardy,4s it nevertheless-with 
Peckham and Brewer in dissent-upheld a Utah statute prohib- 
iting the employment of men in underground mines, smelters, 
and ore or metal refineries for more than eight hours per day, 
except in cases of emergency. The majority commenced with the 
43. 171 U.S. 578, 597-98 (1898). 
44. 165 U.S. at 589. 
45. 169 U.S. 366 (1898). 
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premise that the statute was presumptively constitutional and 
concluded that there were "reasonable grounds" for the legisla- 
tive determination that a restriction on hours of employment in 
such an industry was necessary? But the need for state pater- 
nalism was not apparent to Peckham. Both Gillson and Lochner 
demonstrate that for Peckham the presumption was against 
such legislation, and it was incumbent upon the state to demon- 
strate a direct relation between the legislation and the end 
sought. 
In Lake Shore & Michigan Railway v. the Court 
was asked to determine whether the concededly valid power of 
the Michigan Legislature to fix maximum rates for railroad fares 
included the power to establish lower rates for persons who com- 
plied with certain conditions. The state asserted that the power 
to lower rates in certain cases and to favor certain individuals 
was inherent in its right to fix maximum rates. 
Peckham, speaking for six members of the Court," rejected 
the state's argument and held that the statute unreasonably in- 
terfered with the management of the company. The legislative 
exercise was not simply a lesser right included in the power to 
establish maximum rates. In exercising the power to establish 
maximum rates, argued Peckham, the legislature acts for the 
public generally without discrimination.*@ Thus, the right of the 
legislature to enact rules and regulations for the general conduct 
of the affairs of the company-relating, for example, to the 
scheduling of trains and ticket office hours, and to the accommo- 
dations provided the public generally-was not at issue."O At is- 
sue was the legislature's power to interfere with the management 
of the company by providing an exception from the legislatively 
established general rates in favor of the wholesale buyer: 
If the general power exist, then the legislature can direct the 
company to charge smaller rates for clergymen or doctors, for 
lawyers or farmers or school teachers, for excursions, for 
church conventions, political conventions, or for all or any of 
the various bodies that might desire to ride at any particular 
time or to any particular place.61 
46. Id. at 398. 
47. 173 U.S. 684 (1899). 
48. Chief Justice Fuller and Justices Gray and McKenna dissented. 
49. 173 U.S. at 691. 
50. Id. at 693. 
51. Id. at 694. 
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Peckham again expressed his concern for legislation that could 
increase class conflict in the exercise of legislative power. The 
fact that the railroad discriminated in favor of certain classes 
did not trouble Peckham. Persons had the right to contract to 
do what no legislature could compel them to 
In Peckham's final and most famous (or infamous) liberty of 
contract decision, Lochner u. New Y ~ r k , ~ ~  the Court invalidated, 
by the narrowest of margins, a New York statute limiting bakery 
employees to a ten-hour work day or sixty-hour work week. Un- 
like hstice Harlan in dissent, Peckham could find no "direct 
relation" between this exercise of police power and public 
health. What Peckham demanded of the state was the same in- 
formation that would be presented to a legislative body: 
The mere assertion that the subject relates though but in a re- 
mote degree to the public health does not necessarily render 
the enactment valid. The act must have a more direct relation, 
as a means to an end, and the end itself must be appropriate 
and legitimate . . . . 
. . . . 
. . .[T]he limit of the police power has been reached and 
passed in this case. There is . . . no reasonable foundation for 
holding this to be necessary or appropriate as a health law to 
safeguard the public health or the health of the individuals 
who are following the trade of a baker.* 
In effect, Peckham was ordering the "Brandeis brief," and when 
it was presented three years later in Muller v. Oregon," he voted 
to sustain a similar ordinance applying to women. Thus, it is not 
ironic or paradoxical that the brief submitted by Brandeis in 
Muller relied exclusively on Lochner for law? By concentrating 
on factual material, the Brandeis brief was merely recognizing 
the judicial role defined by Peckham in Lochner. 
This is not to deny that a significant distinction between 
Lochner and Muller was that the statute involved in the latter 
case sought to protect women rather than adult males. A sine 
qua non of the brief of the party seeking the benefit of paternal- 
52. Id. at 697. 
53. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
54. Id. at 57-58. 
55. 208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
56. See A. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 248-49 (1946). See also S. WOOD, 
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 125 (1968) (Muller said to discredit 
Lochner). 
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istic legislation in any case such as Lochner or Muller thus had 
to be that it present to the judiciary evidence demonstrating 
that the legislation involved bears a direct relation to a legiti- 
mate legislative end. I t  is possible that no case could have been 
framed in 1905 that would have persuaded Peckham of the need 
for legislation restricting the "liberty" of adult males. However, 
any successful brief in support of legislation restricting the lib- 
erty of women to contract would have to demonstrate to the 
Court the reasonableness of such legislation. The fact that wo- 
men were involved may have made the burden of demonstrating 
the need for the legislation an easy task; nevertheless, the pre- 
sumption was against the constitutionality of such legislation. 
The liberty of which Peckham spoke was much more than a 
liberty to contract. It was the liberty to be free from the new 
forms of legislative authority chat sought to restrict individual 
freedoms in order to deal with the problems posed by the growth 
of concentrated economic power. Moreover, as shown most 
clearly in his opinions in Gillson, Budd, and Lake Shore & 
Michigan Railway, Peckham conceptualized liberty as including 
the concept of equality before the law. Legislation that discrimi- 
nated among classes was presumptively void. 
Liberty would not be assured by equal treatment before the 
laws if equal opportunity was interfered with by combinations of 
economic power. Thus, although Peckham's conception of lib- 
erty demanded that the Court resist legislative efforts to solve 
the problems of the then rapidly changing world via paternal- 
ism, it demanded that the judiciary support legislative efforts to 
enjoin the growth of corporate power. 
IV. THE SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST ACT 
Peckham took his seat on the Court precisely one year after 
its first effort to apply the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890.57 In 
United States u. E. C. Knightw the Court, marking a clear line 
between manufacturing and commerce, refused to block the sale 
of four Philadelphia sugar refineries to the American Sugar Re- 
fining Co. One year after taking his seat, Peckham began breath- 
ing life into the federal government's effort to check monopolies 
and concentrations of economic power. 
Peckham's sympathy for the government's antitrust efforts 
57. Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. $ 5  1-7 (1976)). 
58. 156 U.S. 1 (1895). 
60 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I980 
seems discordant with his attempts to curtail the growth of leg- 
islative power. But this discord is relieved by recognizing that 
judicial efforts to stem the growth of legislative power were mo- 
tivated by a desire to safeguard individual liberty. Threats to 
individual liberty arose also from the growth of corporate power. 
When the legislature responded to the changing industrial world 
by attacking the corporate entity rather than restricting individ- 
ual freedoms, it had an ally on the Court. 
In United States u. Trans-Missouri Freight Asso~iation,~~ 
the Court followed Peckham's lead and voted five to four to ap- 
ply the Sherman Act to dissolve a freight association formed to 
establish and maintain reasonable rates, rules, and regulations. 
Peckham rejected the argument that the Act only prohibited 
"unreasonable" restraints of trade and found it to prohibit all 
restraints of trade.60 Writing for 'the dissent, Justice White ar- 
gued that Peckham's reading of the Act not only violated the 
common law tradition, but reason as well: 
[Tlhe decision, substantially, is that the act of Congress is a 
departure from the general principles of law, and by its terms 
destroys the right of the individuals or corporations to enter 
into very many reasonable contracts. . . . [Tlhis proposition 
. . . is tantamount to an assertion that the act of Congress is 
itself ~nreasonable.~~ 
The first half of the minority's opinion repeatedly confronted 
Peckham with the apparent inconsistency between his reading of 
the Act and the liberty of the citizen?' 
Peckham's response was rooted in his belief in the value of 
the rugged individual and in his suspicion of concentrated eco- 
nomic power. He warned against permitting businesses to com- 
bine their economic power, since their ultimate purpose was 
to control the production or manufacture of any particular ar- 
ticle in the market, and by such control dictate the price at 
which the article shall be sold, the effect being to drive out of 
business all the small dealers in the commodity and to render 
the public subject to the decision of the combination as to 
what price shall be paid for the article.6s 
59. 166 U.S. 290 (1897). 
60. Id. at 328. 
61. Id. at 344 (White, J., dissenting). 
62. See id. at 344-45, 355-56. 
63. 166 U.S. at 323-24. 
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In Peckham's view it was not in the interest of the country to 
transform "small but independent dealers who were familiar 
with the business and who had spent their lives in it, and who 
supported themselves and their families from the small profits 
realized therein" into "mere servant[s] or agent[s] of a 
corp~ration."~~ 
Not only could Peckham find no distinction between rea- 
sonable and unreasonable restraints of trade,B"e could find 
nothing in the legislative history of the Act or the nature of rail- 
road companies to exclude them from the Act's coverage." In 
fact, Peckham reasoned, considering the public character of such 
corporations-the privileges and franchises they receive from 
the public and the nexus between transportation rates and pub- 
lic ~oncern~~-railroad companies were the paradigmatic corpo- 
ration meant to be regulated by the Act: 
[wlhile, in the absence of a statute prohibiting them, contracts 
of private individuals or corporations touching upon restraints 
in trade must be unreasonable in their nature to be held void, 
different considerations obtain in the case of public corpora- 
tions like those of railroads where it well may be that any re- 
straint upon a business of that character as affecting its rates 
of transportation must thereby be prejudicial to the public 
intere~ts."~ 
Peckham's response to the dilemma outlined by White was 
no illuminating beacon to contemporary observers. What illumi- 
nation it did provide was clouded by his earlier opinion in All- 
geyer, handed down in the same month as Trans-Missouri 
Freight. However, Peckham was given the opportunity to clarify 
his position in United States v. Joint Traffic Associati~n,~~ 
which sustained the government's use of the Sherman Act 
against an association of railroad companies. One argument 
presented by the minority in Trans-Missouri Freight, but not 
addressed by Peckham, was that all contracts restrained trade 
and therefore if no distinction was made between reasonable and 
unreasonable restraints, all such contracts were void.'O In Joint 
64. Id. at 324. 
65. Id. at 328, 332-33. 
66. Id. at 319-20, 324-25. 
67. Id. at 335. 
68. Id. at 334. 
69. 171 U.S. 505 (1898). 
70. 166 U.S. at 351-52 (White, J., dissenting). 
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Traffic Peckham stood by his earlier position, denying that the 
Act drew any such distinction, and added that the Act applied 
only "to those contracts whose direct and immediate effect is a 
restraint upon interstate comrner~e."~' 
Peckham could see no inconsistency between his decision in 
Joint Traffic and his support of the general constitutional right 
of the citizen to make  contract^.^^ The argument based on lib- 
erty of contract had no relevance because the contract was an 
illegal one, and there was no right to enter into an illegal 
contract: 
The citizen may have the right to make a proper (that is, a 
lawful) contract, one which is also essential and necessary for 
carrying out his lawful purposes. The question which arises 
here is, whether the contract is a proper or lawful one, and we 
have not advanced a step towards its solution by saying that 
the citizen is protected by the Fifth, or any other amendment, 
in his right to make proper contracts to enable him to carry 
out his lawful p~rposes.'~ 
Peckham's reasoning was, of course, circular: the contract was 
illegal only if the restriction on liberty of contract was legiti- 
mate. Thus the question was whether the statute was a legiti- 
mate exercise of congressional power over interstate c~mmerce.~' 
Peckham answered in the affirmative: 
[Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce] extends at 
least to the prohibition of contracts relating to interstate com- 
merce, which would extinguish all competition between other- 
wise competing railroad corporations, and which would in that 
way restrain interstate trade or commerce. We do not think, 
when the grantees of this public franchise are competing rail- 
roads seeking the business of transportation of men and goods 
from one State to another, that ordinary freedom of contract in 
the use and management of their property requires the right to 
combine as one consolidated and powerful association for the 
purpose of stifling competition among themselves, and of thus 
keeping their rates and charges higher than they might other- 
wise be under the laws of competition. And this is so, even 
though the rates provided for in the agreement may for the 
time be not more than are reasonable. They may easily and at  
71. 171 U.S. at 568. 
72. Id. at 571. 
73. Id. at 572. 
74. Id. at 573. 
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any time be increased. It is the combination of these large and 
powerful corporations, covering vast sections of territory and 
influencing trade throughout the whole extent thereof, and act- 
ing as one body in all the matters over which the combination 
extends, that constitutes the alleged evil, and in regard to A 
which, so far as the combination operates upon and restrains 
interstate commerce, Congress has power to legislate and to 
pr~hibit. '~ 
The notion that combinations are evil regardless of whether 
rates may be reasonable or even understated is quite consistent 
with Peckham's master idea. 
Two types of business associations not interfering with in- 
terstate commerce, and therefore not within the purview of the 
antitrust provisions, were identified by Peckham in two other 
decisions delivered the same day as Joint Traffic. The first, 
Hopkins v. United States,16 involved an association of 
merchants who sold cattle on commission. The second, Ander- 
son v. United States,77 involved a similar group of associated 
cattle purchasers. Not only did Peckham fail to detect a direct 
impact on interstate commerce from these associations, but he 
considered neither association a novel combination threatening 
the indiv id~al .~~ 
In Hopkins the government unsuccessfully employed a 
unique variation of the liberty of contract argument. A section 
of the employment agreement prohibited the employment of any 
agent, solicitor, or employee except upon a stipulated salary not 
contingent upon the commissions earned, and further provided 
that no more than three solicitors could be employed at one 
time. The government argued that this section of the agreement 
was an infringement of the constitutional right of each associa- 
tion member to make lawful contracts in furtherance of his busi- 
ness." The right of individuals to voluntarily contract to restrict 
their own actions was the essence of liberty of contract for 
Peckham, and was distinguishable from legislative efforts to re- 
strict the actions of individuals. Peckham observed: 
To say that a State would not have the right to prohibit a de- 
fendant from employing as many solicitors as he might choose, 
75. Id. at 570-71. 
76. 171 U.S. 587 (1898). 
77. 171 U.S. 604 (1898). 
78. Id. at 616-17. 
79. 171 U.S. at 600. 
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proves nothing in regard to the right of individuals to agree 
upon that subject in a way which they may think the most con- 
ducive to their own interesk80 
Peckham was never more explicit in his treatment of liberty 
of contract vis-a-vis antitrust regulation than in Addyston Pipe 
& Steel Co. v. United  state^.^' Six corporations engaging in the 
manufacture, sale, and transportation of iron pipe were accused 
of violating the Sherman Act because of collusive bidding on 
contracts to sell and deliver pipe to out-of-state customers. The 
application of the Sherman Act rested on the finding that the 
corporations' activities had a direct and immediate impact on 
interstate ~ornmerce.~' E. C. Knight was readily distinguished in 
that the instant case involved selling and delivery rather than 
mere manufact~ring.~~ It  was further held that a total monopoly 
was not necessary in order to find a combination to be in re- 
straint of trade and thus violative of the Sherman Act?' 
More important for purposes of this study is Peckham's 
treatment of the corporations' argument that the constitutional 
guarantee of liberty of contract operated as a limitation on the 
power of Congress to regulate commerce." The implication of 
the circular reasoning in Joint Traffic was made explicit: Con- 
gress' commerce power was "more important" than each individ- 
ual's liberty of contract.86 Therefore, the congressional authority 
was a legitimate limitation on that individual liberty." Peckham 
believed that the opposite holding would result in a lack of uni- 
formity between different states, as well as an increase in the 
cost and a corresponding decrease in the predictability of anti- 
trust litigation? 
For present purposes, Peckham's final two antitrust opin- 
ions add very little. Both cases employed the direct-indirect test. 
In Bement v. National Harrow C O . , ~ ~  the Sherman Act was set 
up as a defense in a suit for breach of contract in relation to the 
manufacture and sale of an item patented by the plaintiff. 
80. Id. at 603. 
81. 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
82. Id. at 238, 240-41. 
83. Id. at 242. 
84. Id. at 244-45. 
85. See id. at 227. 
86. See id. at 230. 
87. See id. at 229. 
88. Id. at 231-33. 
89. 186 U.S. 70 (1902). 
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Peckham rejected the defense, noting that the very object of the 
patent laws of the United States is monopoly.B0 Although inter- 
state commerce was directly affected, Peckham observed that 
the antitrust law had no application to a situation where reason- 
able and legal conditions restricting the terms upon which the 
patented article could be used and the price to be demanded for 
it were imposed upon the assignee of a patent by the owner. 
In Montague & Co. v. Lowry,@' the Sherman Anti-Trust Act 
was successfully asserted as a defense by a private business suf- 
fering from the price-fixing of an association of tile and fireplace 
fixtures manufacturers and dealers. Following Addyston Pipe, 
Peckham placed the association within the ambit of the Sher- 
man Act. 
The most troubling piece of the Peckham puzzle is North- 
ern Securities Co. v. United States?' Because Peckham gave no 
reasons for his refusal to join the majority in applying the Sher- 
man Act against a holding company formed to combine two rail- 
road lines, his position will never be understood with complete 
certainty. His decision to join Holmes' incredible dissenting 
opinionsa-which misread Peckham's earlier opinions and con- 
ceptualized the Sherman Act as a minor criminal statutes4-is 
beyond explanation. However, if one accepts the probable justi- 
fication for Peckham's reliance on liberty of contract rather than 
on the commerce clause in Allgeyert it is possible to under- 
stand his decision to also join with White in his refusal to accept 
the view that a stock transaction involved an article of interstate 
commerce.* 
90. Id. at 91. 
91. 193 U.S. 38 (1904). 
92. 193 U.S. 197 (1904). 
93. Id. at 400-11 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
94. See D. Steward, The Fuller Court and the Sherman Act 55 (March 1978) (un- 
published article in Yale Law School Library). 
95. 165 U.S. 578 (1897). 
96. See 193 U.S. at 368-69 (White, J., dissenting). Another perplexing piece of the 
Peckham puzzle is Peckham's voting record in the race-relations cases. Although not 
textually relevant here because of the focus on cases involving government regulation of 
the marketplace, it is reasonable to apply the thesis to other matters and wonder why 
the champion of individual liberty and limited government lent his support to the major- 
ity in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). If Peckham believed legislation that dis- 
criminated among classes to be presumptively void, how could he abide a state statute 
that required separate railway coaches for black and white passengers? One is again 
forced to speculate, since Peckham did not explain his position. The equality of which 
Peckham spoke was equality of opportunity and equality before the law, not equality of 
outcome. The majority opinion in Plessy asserted that a "statute which implies merely a 
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Peckham was the mirror image of the Populist.@' The Popu- 
list uniformly reacted against monopoly. Peckham, on the other 
hand, had a certain tolerance for monopoly that resulted from 
rugged individualism. During Peckham's tenure on the Court, 
however, it was becoming increasingly clear that the momentum 
against monopoly was too great for Peckham's approach, and by 
1909 the New York judge who was well known for his activist 
conception of the judicial role in defense of individual liberty, 
legal distinction . . . has no tendency to destroy the legal equality of the two races." Id. 
a t  543. If Peckham viewed the statute as "merely a legal distinction" rather than a 
breach of equality before the law, it is possible that he viewed the petitioner's request as 
an attempt to urge the judiciary itself to tread where government ought not go. Govern- 
ment was powerless to eradicate racial instincts. Id. at 551. Thus, although the statute in 
question was enacted only six years earlier, it may have been viewed as affirming the 
natural order, while judicial intervention may have been viewed as an unwelcome govern- 
mental interference. 
However, such an explanation may not suffice to explain Peckham's vote to support 
the majority in Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908), which upheld a state 
statute prohibiting interracial education even where pupils with parental consent chose 
to sit together. Unlike the Plessy situation, there was no conflict of liberties between the 
parties directly involved. Because of the impact of integration on the larger social struc- 
ture, Peckham may have perceived a clash of liberties. What was the principled distinc- 
tion between the right of the individuals involved in Berea College to associate and the 
right of the employer and employee in Lochner to contract? Was the latter perceived as 
the more "basic" right? 
Was government by judiciary again seen as too obtrusive by Peckham in Cummings 
v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899), which sanctioned the use of 
public funds to support a white high school while assistance to a black high school was 
suspended for economic reasons? For a unanimous Court, Harlan seems to have prophet- 
ically realized the extreme danger of federal judicial intervention in the management of a 
school system. Id. at 545. 
Similar reasoning may explain how Peckham could hope to preserve individual lib- 
erty by voting with the majority in Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903). In Giles the 
Court denied federal jurisdiction to compel state boards of registrars to enroll black vot- 
ers who desired to vote in a forthcoming congressional election. Justice Holmes, writing 
for the Court, observed that unless the courts were willing to supervise the election pro- 
cess, the only thing the plaintiff could receive in a court of equity would be an empty 
promise: "Apart from damages to the individual, relief from a great political wrong, if 
done, as alleged, by the people of a State and the State itself, must be given by them or 
by the legislative and political department of the government of the United States." Id. 
a t  488. 
Finally, how could the great spokesman for liberty of contract join the majority in 
Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906), which denied federal jurisdiction over con- 
spiracies to prevent blacks from making or carrying out labor contracts and agreements. 
From Peckham's frame of reference, Hodges is easily distinguished from Lochner: Lib- 
erty of contract was meant to serve as a check on government power, and Hodges in- 
volved interference by private individuals. 
97. See T. Powers, United States v. E. C.  Knight: The Problem of the People's 
Party and the Antitrust Policy (June 1978) (unpublished article in Yale Law School Li- 
brary), for a description of Populist reaction to the monopoly issue. 
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had become-and continues to be-the object of severe criticism 
by legal scholars. The progressive theory of government was in 
vogue, and Peckham's theory was an anachronism. His notion of 
liberty, one violated by legislation discriminating among classes, 
was gradually giving way to a notion of liberty violated by the 
gross inequity among ~ l a s s e s . ~  
- -- 
98. See generally J. POLE, THE PURSUIT OF EQUALITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1978). 
